This archive includes all published incident pages. Page 6 of 18.
Each page is intended to help a security team answer three questions quickly: why the issue is AI-relevant, what part of the workflow may be exposed, and what actions should happen first.
On October 15, 2025, F5 disclosed that a sophisticated nation-state actor breached its systems and maintained long-term persistent access into F5's infrastructure.
Incident date: February 26, 2026 | Published: February 26, 2026
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.8.0, the CSV Agent node in Langflow hardcodes allow dangerous code=True, which automatically exposes LangChain’s Python REPL tool (python...
Incident date: February 25, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Assessment It is believed that the analysis pass works as intended, REDUCE and BUILD are not at fault here. The few potentially unsafe modules have been added to the blocklist (https://github.
Incident date: February 24, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Assessment The interpreter so it behaves closer to CPython when dealing with OBJ , NEWOBJ , and NEWOBJ_EX opcodes (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/ff423dade2bb1f72b2b48586c022fac40cbd9a4a).
Incident date: February 24, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
A denial of service vulnerability exists in Fiber v2 and v3 that allows remote attackers to crash the application by sending requests to routes with more than 30 parameters.
Incident date: February 24, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary The use of the fiber_flash cookie can force an unbounded allocation on any server. A crafted 10-character cookie value triggers an attempt to allocate up to 85GB of memory via unvalidated msgpack deserialization.
Incident date: February 24, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary **Description** A Path Traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability in Fiber allows a remote attacker to bypass the static middleware sanitizer and read arbitrary files on the server file system on Windows.