This archive includes all published incident pages. Page 12 of 18.
Each page is intended to help a security team answer three questions quickly: why the issue is AI-relevant, what part of the workflow may be exposed, and what actions should happen first.
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Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary This is a scanning bypass to scan_pytorch function in picklescan . As we can see in the implementation of [get_magic_number()](https://github.
Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary openclaw could start the sandbox browser bridge server without authentication. When the sandboxed browser is enabled, openclaw runs a local (loopback) HTTP bridge that exposes browser control endpoints (for example /profiles ,...
Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary The Feishu extension could fetch attacker-controlled remote URLs in two paths without SSRF protections: - sendMediaFeishu(mediaUrl) - Feishu DocX markdown image URLs (write/append -> image processing) ### Affected versions - = 2026.
Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary The BlueBubbles extension accepted attacker-controlled local filesystem paths via mediaPath and could read arbitrary local files from disk before sending them as media attachments.
Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary Inter-session messages sent via sessions_send could be interpreted as direct end-user instructions because they were persisted as role: "user" without provenance metadata.
Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
**Date:** 2025-12-07 **Vulnerability:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) **Component:** Webhooks Module ## Executive Summary A critical security vulnerability exists in the LibreDesk Webhooks module that allows an authenticated...
Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Command hijacking via PATH handling **Discovered:** 2026-02-04 **Reporter:** @akhmittra ## Summary OpenClaw previously accepted untrusted PATH sources in limited situations.
Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary Multiple webhook handlers accepted and buffered request bodies without a strict unified byte/time limit. A remote unauthenticated attacker could send oversized payloads and cause memory pressure, degrading availability.
Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary Archive extraction lacked strict resource budgets, allowing high-expansion ZIP/TAR archives to consume excessive CPU/memory/disk during install/update flows. ## Affected Packages / Versions - openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.
Incident date: February 18, 2026 | Published: February 25, 2026
Summary Base64-backed media inputs could be decoded into Buffers before enforcing decoded-size budgets. An attacker supplying oversized base64 payloads can force large allocations, causing memory pressure and denial of service.